The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility by Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno
The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will
and Personal Responsibility
Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters
Received: 2 February 2009 /Accepted: 23 November 2009 /Published online: 15 December 2009
# The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Many philosophers ignore developments in
the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that
purport to challenge our ideas of free will and
responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge
is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able
to act differently than we do. However, most
philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is
irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is
our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue
that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so
obvious that our views of free will and responsibility
can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons
without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This
poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the
conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address
the recent scientific developments and that scientists
are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of
the freedom to do otherwise.
Keywords Compatibilism.Actingforreasons.
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Introduction
The behavioral, cognitive,and neurosciences (hereafter:
the BCN-sciences) are gradually beginning torevealthe
mechanisms that make us who we are. The success of
this enterprise has led some to worry that these sciences
will undermine the notion of free will and the idea that
people are responsible for what they do [e.g. 1–3].
The feared challenge of the BCN-sciences is often
seen as a denial of the idea that persons are able to act
differently than they in fact do. However, many
philosophers have abandoned the idea that the ability
to do otherwise is relevant to free will and responsi-
bility long ago and they tend to dismiss the challenge
as directed at an outdated view [e.g. 4, 5].
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According to a strong and influential current in
philosophy, it is rather the ability to act for reasons
that is crucial to our everyday practices of personal
responsibility [e.g. 9–11]. We shall call this view
‘new compatibilism’. One important reason to favor
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1 We suggest that the fears raised by the results of Libet’s[ 6]
experiments on the timing of consciousness in relation to brain
activity and bodily movement and bold titles such as Wegner’s
The Illusion of Conscious Will [7] concern the thesis that
consciousness does not influence our behavior rather than their
alleged support for determinism. Such a lack of influence (if
true) would threaten compatibilist and incompatibilist positions
alike. Several compatibilists have recognized this threat and
argued in response that the impotence of consciousness does
not follow from the experimental results (e.g. [8]). We agree
with that conclusion.
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accounts in terms of the ability to do otherwise is that
it seems so obvious that we act for reasons, whereas it
is unclear and highly controversial what kind of
ability the ability to do otherwise would be (especially
if our behavior turns out to be determined by genes
and environment). Because such determinism seems
not to preclude us from acting for reasons, research
that merely seems to strengthen determinism is
perceived as irrelevant by these compatibilists.
Ironically, as we shall show, the ability to act for
reasons is central to a great deal of interesting
research in the BCN-sciences. This research indicates,
as we shall argue, that it is not as obvious as it seems
that the ability to act for reasons can serve as an
unproblematic basis to justify our daily practices of
responsibility. This does not imply, of course, that this
research shows that we do not act for reasons, but it
does pose a challenge to new compatibilist philoso-
phers, as we shall explain.
2 This challenge deserves
full philosophical attention.
This paper has two aims. We would like to invite
those who think that the BCN-findings challenge our
views of free will and personal responsibility to
explicitly address the new compatibilist view, and
we aim to convince the new compatibilist that the
results from the BCN-sciences provide an interesting
challenge to what we believe to be the core strength
of their position.
In “The Classical Problem”, “Two Crucial Turns”,
“New Compatibilism” we present a short en sketchy
introduction to the view we call ‘new compatibilism’.
These sections are not meant as a review of the state
of the art of the contemporary free will debate, but as
an introduction to one influential and attractive family
of positions in this debate, namely the positions we
collect under the heading ‘new compatibilism’.I n
“The Classical Problem” we introduce the idea of free
will as the ability to do otherwise and the debate
about the compatibility of this notion with the thesis
of determinism. In “Two Crucial Turns” we describe
two important contributions to the discussion that
shifted attention away from the ability to do otherwise
and determinism. Peter Strawson moved the focus of
the debate to our everyday practices of holding
ourselves and each other responsible for what we do.
Harry Frankfurt argued that in those practices talk of
‘free will’ does not refer to alternative possibilities, but
tosomethingwedidwillingly.In“New Compatibilism”
we describe the new compatibilist view and explain
why it is so attractive. In “BCN Findings” we
summarize some relevant BCN-findings. In “New
Problems” we explain how these findings pose a
challenge to new compatibilist philosophers. In
“Conclusion” we draw some conclusions.
The Classical Problem
The problem of free will is one of the oldest and most
frequently discussed in philosophy. It is traditionally
framed as the problem of how to reconcile freedom
and determinism. This difficulty arises out of the
tension between our view of ourselves as persons who
can be held responsible for what they do, and the
scientific view that depicts our actions as the combined
result of genes and environment. The traditional view
is that humans are responsible for what they do to the
extent that they have the freedom to do otherwise.
Determinism poses a threat to personal responsibility
because, if true, it is not clear how it could ever be
possible that someone could ever do otherwise.
Classical compatibilists (beginning with Thomas
Hobbes in the 17th century) argued that determinism
does not exclude human freedom by interpreting the
principle of alternative possibilities in a conditional
way. According to them being able to do otherwise
means that one would have done otherwise if one had
willed or chosen to do otherwise.
Incompatibilists such as Thomas Reid (18th cen-
tury) have objected that, while this interpretation
might perhaps salvage human freedom, it does not
restore personal responsibility. Suppose, for example
that, unbeknown to me, some gum that I chewed
contained nicotine, and that the taste of nicotine
triggered my former addiction. Most people would
agree that, in this situation, I am less responsible for
taking the cigarette on the table in front of me than I
would have been had I not chewed the gum.
However, in either scenario I willed or chose to take
the cigarette and would not have taken the cigarette if
I had willed or chosen otherwise. The argument, of
2 As the ability to act for reasons also figures in other accounts
of personal responsibility, some or all of the challenges for new
compatibilism identified by us, may apply to other views as
well. We leave it to others to point that out.
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with. So, according to traditional incompatibilists one
cannot be blamed for doing what one chooses to do if
the choice is not free. Hence, personal responsibility
can be salvaged only if one could have chosen
otherwise and this possibility does not exists in a
deterministic world. Incompatibilists come into two
kinds: libertarians who hold that incompatibilist free
will exists and that determinism is untrue and hard
determinist who hold the opposite view.
In some senses, the BCN-sciences aggravate the
problem of determinism. As long as we did not know
the workings of the brain, we could believe that
incompatibilist free will enters somewhere in the
brain. However, as the brain sciences advance and we
learn more and more about our brains, the lack of any
scientific basis for incompatibilist free will strength-
ens the idea that this kind of free will does not exist.
3
Given the emphasis on the determinism issue in the
discussion about the BCN-sciences, it is easy for
compatibilist philosophers (which has been the
dominant view in philosophy for many centuries) to
maintain that those sciences do not pose a threat to
free will. If free will and determinism are compatible,
the alleged support of determinism by the results of
the BCN-sciences cannot pose a threat to free will.
Moreover, in the eyes of many compatibilists,
libertarianism had already been dismissed on philo-
sophical grounds, so why bother about a threat to this
outdated view?
4
As we argue below, this response ignores the
specific character of the new compatibilist answer to
the incompatibilist challenge. The new compatibilist
approach is based on the idea that personal responsi-
bility is grounded not in our assumed ability to choose
otherwise, but in our ability to decide and act on the
basis of reasons. In the example of the gum chewing
smoker the new compatibilist would point out that the
unknown presence of nicotine in the gum prevented
the smoker from deciding on the basis of the relevant
reasons. In this view it is the impossibility to take an
influence (the presence of nicotine) into account that
lessens responsibility, not the diminished ability not to
take the cigarette (whatever that would be). Ironically,
it is our ability to act for reasons in relation to all the
factors that influence us (including those we are not
aware of) rather than our ability to do otherwise on
which the BCN-sciences focus. In order to explain
new compatibilism and the challenges posed by the
BCN-sciences we first need to discuss two landmark
insights that explain how compatibilist came to see
the ability to do otherwise as irrelevant to free will
and personal responsibility.
Two Crucial Turns
Nowadays many compatibilists propose to sidestep
the whole issue of the compatibility of the freedom to
do otherwise with the thesis of determinism. They
focus on a concept of personal responsibility that does
not require such a freedom. A first landmark in the
development of this idea is Peter Strawson’s seminal
“Freedom and Resentment” [14]. Strawson pointed
out that our interpersonal relations are inextricably
intertwined with spontaneous reactive attitudes such
as gratitude and resentment, attitudes that constitute
the practice of holding ourselves and each other
responsible for what we do. In Strawson’s view the
abolition of this practice is impossible and undesirable
because it constitutes the natural human way of
relating to each other.
Strawson observes that our natural tendency to
react to wrongdoing with sentiments such as guilt,
resentment, blame, and moral indignation is lessened
only when we discover that the wrongdoer did not
mean harm (excuses) or that she was not a full-blown
adult human being at the moment of her action
(exemptions). In the latter case, we switch to what
Strawson calls the ‘objective attitude’ towards this
person, no longer regarding her as a human equal but
as someone to be treated or manipulated or otherwise
prevented to act wrongly. On the basis of this
observation, Strawson argued that the thesis of
determinism would threaten our everyday practices
of moral responsibility only when it could be
understood as implying ‘no one ever meant any
harm’ or that ‘everyone should be regarded from the
objective attitude’. This, according to him, is an
absurd suggestion. Hence, the thesis of determinism is
irrelevant to our views of moral responsibility.
5
3 See Kane [12] for an honest attempt to locate free will in the
brain.
4 For an excellent discussion of the literature on this subject,
see Roskies [5]. We wrote a short reaction in the spirit of the
argument of this paper [13].
5 We discuss this argument elaborately elsewhere [15].
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temporary positions
6 and also inspired many objec-
tions.
7 Relevant to our purposes is that his essay
changed the way in which philosophers discuss
personal responsibility. In the wake of Strawson’s
essay our every day practices of responsibility, the
distinctions we make in those practices, the conditions
in which we excuse and exempt wrongdoers, and the
reasons we give for our moves in those practices
became the central focus of the debate. Contemporary
philosophical accounts of responsibility aim to cap-
ture, understand, and evaluate the conditions for
responsibility and the excusing and exempting con-
ditions that we accept in everyday life.
Nowadays many philosophers are convinced that
alternative possibilities are not among those everyday
conditions. This idea was brought home by Harry
Frankfurt [20]. Frankfurt argued that when we talk
about ‘free will’ in our everyday practices, about
‘doing something of our own free will’, we do not
refer to indeterminist intuitions of any kind. Rather,
we are simply referring to something that we did
willingly. For example, if I witness a crime and do not
warn the police out of disinterest, the fact that I could
not have warned them because—unknown to me—
my phone has been disconnected, seems irrelevant to
my responsibility for not warning the police. How
exactly to define what it means to ‘do something
willingly’ is, even today, subject to controversy. For
our purposes, it is sufficient to understand it as in
some relevant sense ‘authorized’ by the self/person;
as something we ‘agree with,’‘ accept,’ or ‘positively
endorse’ (‘decisive identification’ and ‘wholehearted-
ness’ are the phrases Frankfurt [21, 22] uses).
Central to Frankfurt’s hierarchical view is the idea
that, as human beings we are not only directed at the
world by desiring certain things (e.g. chocolate, a
career, to stay dry when it rains), but are also directed
at the desires that move us into action. Hence, we
might prefer not to have the desire for chocolate, but
we might be glad for and embrace our desire to work.
It is within this framework that we should understand
‘free will’. I act of my own free will when the desires
that move me into action are the desires I authorize; I
typically lack free will when the desires that move me
into action are desires I resist, feel alienated from, and
do not identify with.
Frankfurt’s work opened up a new way of
understanding free will without the need to meet the
challenge posed by determinism and/or the conceptual
problems attached to indeterminism. Frankfurt also
offered an attractive explanation for the widespread
and, in his eyes, mistaken idea that libertarian free
will matters to our everyday practices of responsibil-
ity. He pointed out that we sometimes seem to excuse
people for wrongdoing because they ‘could not have
done otherwise,’ for example, when someone hurts us
because she is pushed into us by another or by the
abrupt movement of the train we are both on.
However, Frankfurt points out that the reason that
we accept this as an excuse is that we believe that the
person would have done otherwise if she could have
done otherwise. In other words, we believe that if she
were not pushed, she would have avoided hurting us.
According to Frankfurt, it is misleading to say that we
excuse her because she lacks alternatives; we excuse
her because she hurts us ‘only because’ she could not
have done otherwise. It is not the lack of alternatives
but the fact that we assume that, if she were not
pushed, she would not have hurt us [20].
Frankfurt’s criticism of the idea that responsibility
is grounded in the ability to do otherwise is one of the
defining landmarks in contemporary discussions on
free will and responsibility. It needs to be addressed
by everyone who defends or argues against a
libertarian account of free will. However, it is not
easy to formulate adequate conditions for personal
responsibility based on Frankfurt’s hierarchical view.
Whereas the fact that someone wholeheartedly iden-
tifies with a certain action might be sufficient to hold
her personally responsible for it even if alternate
possibilities were absent (we will come back to this
below), there is little reason to excuse someone for
moral wrongdoings only because she did not whole-
heartedly identify with them e.g. if someone steals my
wallet, her reluctance to do so (because she knows
that I need the money) does not in itself seem to
lessen her personal responsibility.
6 For example the work of new compatibilists such as Wallace
[10] and Wolf [16]. Also see [17].
7 See the above mentioned authors, but also Nagel’s famous
objection against the idea that we could prevent a slide from
‘internal’ to ‘external’ criticism of our everyday practices of
moral responsibility [18] and Paul Russell excellent essay about
the tension between several of the arguments Strawson
endorses to prevent this so-called slide from internal to external
criticism [19].
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Many contemporary compatibilists looking for a
justification of our common practices of responsibility
have turned to a concept that we, for the purposes of
this paper, will label ‘reasons-responsiveness’ [e.g. 9–
11].
8 This is the approach that we call ‘new
compatibilism.’ It is currently one of the most
important and influential views in philosophy.
According to new compatibilism the ultimate
justification of our practices of responsibility lies in
our ability to act for reasons. Roughly, the idea is that
we are responsible for what we do because we are the
kind of beings that can figure out what to do and
respond correspondingly. We are ‘sane’ human beings
who are able to distinguish good from bad and are
able to adjust our behavior in the light of it [16]. What
capacities exactly make up our ability to act for
reasons is a controversial matter. However, it is not
controversial that in the case of human beings we can
make a distinction between, on the one hand, actions
done for reasons (stopping your car because others
have right of way), and, on the other hand, bodily
movements that are mere reactions to internal and
external causes (tripping on the carpet). New compa-
tibilism claims that we can understand and justify our
everyday practices of responsibility on the basis of
this distinction without further appeal to an assumed
ability to do otherwise.
Unlike Frankfurt, new compatibilists do not believe
that our personal responsibility can be grounded purely
on a person’s attitude towards the desires she acts
upon. New compatibilists argue that in our practices of
responsibility, in order to be held responsible, it does
not suffice that an agent did something because she
freely willed it; she should also be a sane and morally
competent being (at the time of her action and with
regard to it). That is, she should not only act on the
basis of considerations that she accepts as reasons, but
these considerations should also be real reasons. For
example, if someone murders her neighbor because she
understands this neighbor to, literally, be the devil; this
person might be free in the sense that the murder was
one she wholeheartedly embraced as the necessary and
required thing to do at that moment, yet she cannot be
held personally responsible for it because she does not
qualify as a sane and morally competent being.
9
Much more can be said about the notion of
reasons-responsiveness and the conditions for respon-
sibility based on this idea. However, for our purposes,
it suffices to point out that, what is central and
common to these views is the idea that some people
clearly are reasons-responsive in that they act for
reasons they can explain and justify, whereas others
are not, either temporarily (e.g. when acting under
conditions of extreme personal distress) or more
permanently (e.g., when suffering from a mental
illness that affects their moral competence).
This, we believe, is the strength and attraction of
the new compatibilist view. Contrary to views that
connect personal responsibility with the ability to do
otherwise, new compatibilism does not need to
assume the existence of a metaphysical obscure
counterfactual freedom, i.e. ‘that we could have done
otherwise than we actually did.’ They just point out
that we are the kind of beings who regularly act for
reasons and that it is our ability to do so that
determines our status as responsible agents. It seems
obvious that this is the case. We often manage to
observe traffic regulations (e.g. to stop for the reason
that another has right of way), play difficult games
such as chess, and know exactly how and when to be
polite, to give a few examples. Within that picture, we
are excused if, and only if, our ability to act for
reasons was imposed upon (e.g. because we were
pushed or constrained) or undermined (e.g. because
we were under hypnosis or suffering from a mental
disease). In this way, new compatibilism can have its
cake and eat it too. It enables us to do full justice to
8 We use the term ‘reasons-responsiveness’ in line with Wolf
[16] and Wallace [10] as an indication of the tenor of the new
compatibilist approach, not as a specific condition for respon-
sibility based on this approach. This use of the term ‘reasons-
responsiveness’ differs from Fischer & Ravizza’s[ 9] use of that
term. The latter develop the general idea of reasons-
responsiveness (in Wolf’s and Wallace’s sense) by specifying
two conditions for responsibility: ‘ownership’ and ‘reasons-
responsiveness’ (in a more specific sense).
9 To be sure, these claims are vulnerable to all kinds of
complicating objections. For example, even though many of us
fail to grasp fundamentalist motivations and worldviews, we do
hold those who act in accordance with them personally
responsible. Therefore, who determines who is to count as
sane and what actions are to count as ‘morally deviant’ instead
of the result of mental illness? We have elaborated on these
problems elsewhere [23].
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getting into ‘metaphysical trouble’, or so it seems.
BCN Findings
Before we explain how the BCN-sciences challenge
new compatibilist accounts of responsibility, let us
first turn to the BCN literature that deals with our
ability to act for reasons. According to this literature
the reasons we give for our behaviors do not tell us
about the inner deliberations that motivated our
actions, but rather explain and justify these behaviors
in a post-hoc manner, confabulating reasons if needed
and rationalizing our behavior if that suits. In the next
section we will explain how these findings challenge
new compatibilism. Our point will not be that the
BCN-sciences indicate that we are not reasons-
responsive, but rather that in the light of the BCN-
findings the concept of reasons-responsiveness turns
out to be not as clear and free of metaphysics as it
seems.
Confabulation was discovered by Michael S.
Gazzaniga in the early seventies when he experi-
mented with patients whose corpus callosum (the
only direct nerve connection between the two hemi-
spheres of the brain) has been severed [24]. Split-
brain patients (as these patients are known) cannot
describe pictures presented to only the left part of the
visual field. This is because the information from the
left visual field is routed to the right hemisphere and
hence, is not available to the speech center in the left
hemisphere if the brain is split. However, these
patients are able to pick up with their left hand, a
card related to a picture in the left visual field. In one
experiment, Gazzaniga showed a boy two pictures at
the same time, one in the left and one in the right
visual field, each visible to a different hemisphere.
The right hemisphere saw a snow scene, the left
hemisphere a chicken claw. When asked to pick up
cards related to what he saw, the boy picked up a
picture of a shovel with his left hand and a picture of
a chicken with his right. He explained this by saying
that he picked the chicken because he saw a claw; and
the shovel because you have to clean the chicken shed
with a shovel. He had no idea that he was making up
plausible reasons to explain his behavior, caused by
factors of which he was not aware. Gazzaniga has
argued that this tendency to confabulate reasons is not
an aberration of split-brain patients, but a process that
occurs often when people are not aware of the causes
of their actions.
In their discussion of our ability to introspect about
our higher cognitive processes, Nisbett and Wilson
[25] go a step further than Gazzaniga. Not only do
they suggest we easily confabulate reasons when we
do not know the causes of our actions, but that we
also lack introspective insight into those causes.
Instead, causes are inferred based on ‘a priori causal
theories’ originating from experience and the social
environment. These theories tell us the possible
causes of certain actions. When asked to explain an
action, we determine which of the possible causes
were present at the time of the action and cite that as
the reason for the action. If we cannot find a plausible
reason, we confabulate one. Causes that escaped our
attention, causes that are not easily remembered, and
causes that are not within our known range of
possible causes will never be cited.
Wegner [7] takes this one step further, arguing that
even the feeling of having acted is the result of the
application of certain general principles of causal
inference, rather than direct experience. We infer that
we initiated a certain action in the same way as we
infer that the movement of one billiard ball caused the
movement of another. More specifically, people
experience themselves as the originator of a certain
event when they have a conscious thought
corresponding to that event just prior to it and when
they do not observe an alternative cause for that
event. To support this theory, Wegner and his
colleagues devised some very ingenious experiments.
In the ‘IS p y ’ study [26] a participant and a
confederate together moved a computer mouse to
guide a cursor on a screen with many small pictures.
They were asked to stop cursor movement after a
signal. Unknown to the participant, the confederate
forced the cursor to stop at a certain picture. It turned
out that, when the experimenter induced thoughts
about the relevant picture either 1 or 5 s before the
movement was halted, the participants reported
feeling that they intentionally stopped the cursor at
that picture. When the thoughts were induced 30 s
before the movement was halted or one second after
it, they said that they merely allowed the other to stop
the cursor. In another experiment [27], the experi-
menters asked participants, allegedly as part of a
study of psychological influences on health, to
126 M. Sie, A. Woutersperform a voodoo curse upon another person, in the
presence of that person. The other person was a
confederate who, at the end of the experiment,
pretended to have a headache. Participants that were
led to have negative thoughts about the confederate
(for example, because he behaved badly) attributed
the headache much more frequently to the curse than
participants in whom no such thoughts were induced.
What this research shows is that we do not have
access to the inner processes that connect the causes
of our actions with the actions. When asked for
reasons, we interpret our behavior with the help of a
priori theories. Of course, it does not follow from this
that we do not act for reasons, nor that conscious
thoughts do not influence our actions. Nisbett and
Wilson emphasized that a priori theories usually give
quite reliable estimates about the real causes of our
actions. Wegner admits that the application of
principles of causal inference usually lead to correct
identification of the originator of an action.
10
Why should we bother about the mistakes people
tend to make in ingeniously constructed, highly
unusual, experimental conditions? It is not the fact
that people make mistakes that challenges new
compatibilism, but rather the new picture of the
process of giving reasons that is supported by these
mistakes. The mistakes indicate that the process of
providing reasons is quite different from what it
seems and only loosely connected to the processes
that generate the actions. Initially one might think that
when we give reasons we recollect the motives that
drove our actions. The fact that people can make real
errors in reporting reasons (errors that are neither the
result from conscious or unconscious distortion of
what they perceived, nor of an unwillingness to
perceive their motives) shows that we have no direct
access to our motives and, hence, that we do not
recollect our motives when asked for reasons, but
infer them on the basis of the information we do have.
As in any experiment, the assumption is that the
processes operating in the experimental conditions are
the same as in the normal conditions. Compare this to
the study of optical illusions. Just like the mistakes we
discussed above, many optical illusions occur only in
unusual and artificial conditions (when looking at
drawings, movies or rooms that are especially
designed to elicit the illusion), but this does not
prevent them from providing insight in the manner in
which we normally process visual input. In the same
way the reasons brought up in experimental con-
ditions and the mistakes people make in such
situations provide insight in the way in which the
process of giving reasons normally operate.
Another line of research however, does seem to
lead to the conclusion that reasoning does not
influence our moral judgments. This line of research
originates in work emphasizing the role of intuitions
and emotions in human decision-making [28] and in
work that suggests that most of our everyday life is
determined by automatic processes triggered by our
social environment and operating without conscious
awareness or guidance [29]. In an exciting and
controversial article, the moral psychologist Jonathan
Haidt [30] combined these insights and applied them
to moral thinking to argue for what he called the
‘Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment’.
According to this model, our moral judgments are
not caused by moral reasoning, but rather are the
result of intuitions: more or less instantaneous feel-
ings of approval or disapproval that pop up in our
minds and are generated by rapid unconscious
processes. Moral reasoning is, in this view, just a
post hoc attempt to justify these feelings and
influence other people. Later research indicates that
this model needs important qualifications,
11 but the
important point for our purposes is the suggestion
that, overall, moral deliberation might be post-hoc.
Finally, there is a line of research known as
‘situationist psychology’ that indicates that our moral
judgments are influenced by many irrelevant factors
(e.g. being in a hurry),
12 some of which might even
escape our attention (e.g. in cases where we are
‘primed’). For example, in the famous ‘Good Samar-
10 Wegner repeatedly suggests that thoughts and actions are the
parallel results of a common unconscious process and that
thoughts do not influence actions. This conclusion is consistent
with his research, but it is not the only explanation for the
results. One might also see the principle as giving reliable
insight in what actually happens.
11 In a subsequent paper Haidt himself took a more nuanced
view on this issue [31].
12 Whether a factor is irrelevant or not is of course, open to
discussion. What we refer to in this case are the considerations
that the agents themselves would not mention in accounting for
their decision, action, or behavior or would not consider
relevant.
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willingness to help a stranger in distress varied in
accordance with the degree to which they believed
themselves to be in a hurry. This, in itself, might not
sound so shocking in an age where time is precious
and helping strangers is not always without danger,
however; the experiment was performed more than
three decades ago with students in training for a
helping profession (students of a theological semi-
nary). The degree of time pressure was manipulated
by telling them they were ‘early,’‘ right on time,’ or
‘late’ for a video recording of a sermon about the
biblical story of the Good Samaritan as part of their
training [32, 33]. Surely, one would expect people
training for a helping profession to be sensitive to
the needs of someone in distress, regardless of
being in a hurry. More recently, Wheatley and
Haidt [34] hypnotically primed people to react with
disgust to an arbitrary word and asked them to assess
the severity of certain moral transgressions. They
found that the participants were harsher in their
judgment when the description contained the primed
words. Schnall et al. [35] discovered that such things
as the cleanliness of the table or the presence of
certain odors could influence the severity of moral
judgments.
To sum up these findings, BCN-research suggests
that ‘providing reasons’ for our behavior is an
interesting and complicated process that is better
described as ‘interpreting our behavior’ than ‘recall-
ing what moved us’. This process is guided by a priori
theories that inform us of plausible causes for our
actions. Many factors that influence our behavior
escape our attention and we are inclined to fill in the
gaps in our knowledge with fabrications that are
experienced as real. This process is tailored to justify
our behavior and convince others, rather than to
providing the truth about the motives of our actions.
In the next section, we explain how this idea
challenges the new compatibilist view of personal
responsibility.
New Problems
As we discussed in “New Compatibilism” among the
main attractions of new compatibilism are its founda-
tion in the seemingly obvious fact that we act for
reasons, as is evidenced by the efficacy of our daily
practice of giving and asking for reasons, and the idea
that our daily practices of responsibility (including the
assumption that at least some people sometimes do
things for which they are not responsible and our
habit to hold people by default responsible for what
they do) can be legitimized on the basis of this fact,
without further appeal to obscure notions such as the
ability to do otherwise. In this section we will argue
that the BCN-findings discussed in “BCN Findings”
cast doubts on this latter claim.
The BCN-evidence indicates that many actions for
which the actor can give reasons are automatic
responses to external stimuli, many of which are not
recognized by the actor. These findings have led
many scientists to the conclusion that, normally,
people do not act for reasons. We do not think that
this conclusion follows. Saying that a certain act was
performed for a particular reason does not necessarily
mean that that act resulted in one way or another from
a conscious process of reasoning. There might be
ways to accommodate the BCN-finding that normally
people act automatically while maintaining that
people normally act for reasons.
Yet, we do think that these findings spell trouble
for the new compatibilist, for, if these findings are
true, new compatibilists must find a way to view
automatic actions as actions for a reason if they are to
avoid the conclusion that acting for reasons is
exceptional. Because new compatibilists are also
committed to the thesis that the ability to act for
reasons distinguishes actions for which the actor is
responsible from action for which she is not, it
follows that new compatibilists must come up with
an account of what distinguishes automatic actions for
a reason from automatic actions that were not for a
reason. It is far from obvious that such a distinction
can be made without introducing obscurities such as
the ability to do otherwise.
This challenge is aggravated by the BCN-thesis
that giving reasons is more a matter of interpretation
than of recollection. As we explained in “New
Compatibilism” the project of new compatibilism is
to legitimate our common practices of responsibility
independent of the issue whether someone ever could
have acted otherwise. In practice, the issue of
personal responsibility typically arises when someone
behaves immorally without an adequate excuse or
exemption. In such cases of wrongdoing we assume
that there is a distinction between cases in which
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those in which they are not. We shall call the first type
of cases ‘blameful wrongdoing’ and the latter ‘blame-
less wrongdoing’.
According to new compatibilism, the distinction
between blameful and blameless wrongdoing in our
daily practice is made and should be made based on
the ability to act for reasons. However, someone who
acts immorally without an adequate excuse or
exemption in fact ignores the reasons or moral
justifications for not acting in such a way. Clearly,
someone who steals without an adequate excuse fails
to respond to the reasons not to steal. That is, cases of
wrongdoing by their very nature disclose a failure to
respond adequately to reasons (see [23], Chapter 3).
This means that the distinction between blameful and
blameless wrongdoing cannot be viewed as a distinc-
tion between wrongdoings in which one did respond
to reasons and wrongdoings in which one did not; it
must be seen as a distinction between being able to
respond to reasons and not being able to do so. It
follows that the new compatibilist is committed to the
view that in cases of blameful wrongdoing a person
did not respond to the reasons there were, although
she could have done so. This sounds astonishing like
saying that she would have been able to do otherwise!
At this point, new compatibilists might want to
point out that our every day practices provide
evidence for the view that in some cases of
wrongdoing wrong doers are capable of responding
to reasons although in fact they did not do so. The
kleptomaniac is deemed unaccountable because she
communicates that she feels awful about her behavior
and freely commits herself to treatment (showing she
is not able to respond to reasons). The thieving
student is deemed accountable either because her
remorse shows her to be aware of having made a
wrong choice (showing that she is able to respond to
reasons); or, alternatively, because her anger at us,
shows her unwillingness to accept our norms and
values, which we firmly believe to be valid (showing
that she responds to reasons, albeit to reasons we do
not accept). So although we have a problem to
explain how it is possible that people are sometimes
able to respond to reasons to which they did not
respond, we might be sure that this sometimes is the
case.
However, if the BCN-sciences are right that
reasons are inferred after the fact, it is far from clear
that this practice provides the evidence needed by the
new compatibilist. For the BCN-view suggests that
differences between the self-reports of the thieving
student and the kleptomaniac might result only from
differences in their ability or willingness to account
for their failure to respond to the reasons there are,
rather than from differences in their capability to act
for reasons.
The problem is not that people can make mistakes
in their self-reports or lie about their motivations. The
problem is that if giving reasons is a matter of post
hoc interpretation, the alleged fact that we can make a
distinction between blameful and blameless wrong-
doers on the basis of the reasons they provide, does
not provide evidence for the view that there ever are
wrongdoers who are able to respond to reasons
although they do not do so. It might only indicate
that some people are better than others in rationalizing
their failure to respond to the reasons there are. The
thieving student might be just as incapable to act for
reasons as the kleptomaniac although she thinks
otherwise (and due to her rationalizing talents is able
to convince others of it too).
Let us stress that we do not think that the BCN-
sciences have shown that it is impossible for someone
not to respond to reasons while being able to do so, or
that the BCN-sciences show that our everyday ways
of judging whether some wrongdoer can be held
responsible for what she did are illegitimate. Our
point is rather that in the light of the BCN-sciences it
is unclear what it would mean to fail to respond to
reasons while being capable of doing so and hence
that it is unclear how on the new compatibilist view
someone could ever be responsible for doing wrong.
The new compatibilist needs an account of what it
means to be able to respond to reasons while in
fact failing to do so, an argument based on this
account that shows that it is a real possibility that
someone who did not respond to reasons was
nevertheless able to respond to those reasons, and
an argument that this account legitimates our
common practices of deciding about the blameful-
ness of wrongdoings.
Fischer & Ravizza ([9] Chapter 3] provide an
account that seems tailor made to solve this problem.
Put very simply, the idea is that a person who in a
certain case did not respond to certain reasons is
nevertheless able to respond to those reasons if there
is a scenario available in which she would have
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13 Suppose someone stole a
wallet. If she would not have stolen it when a police
officer was standing next to her, this would show that
she was nevertheless able to respond to the reasons
not to steal. As Fischer and Ravizza put it: “we
believe that, if an agent’s mechanism reacts to some
incentive ... this shows that the mechanism can react
to any incentive” [9: 73].
At first sight this is an interesting and appealing
idea. However, the argument is flawed. It does not
help to distinguish between the thieving student and
the kleptomaniac. For, a kleptomaniac, too, would be
able not to steal under conditions such as having a
police officer stand beside her. However, most of us
do not need a police officer to prevent us from
stealing. Therefore, the very fact that someone would
steal means that she does not respond to the reasons
to which most of us would respond i.e. internal
reasons. Why would the fact that a person reacts to
other reasons (the presence of a police officer)
indicate she was nevertheless able to react to the
reasons to which she did not respond? Fischer and
Ravizza [9: 74] suggest that this inference is justified
to the extent that the decision mechanism is the same
in both situations. Yet, this response only displaces
the problem, for it gives rise to the question of how to
decide whether the same mechanism is in play. How
can we be sure that this is the case and on what basis
do we infer it?
The assumption that the ability to react to one
reason provides evidence that one is able to react to
all the reasons one recognizes is seriously challenged
by situationist psychologists who have investigated
the influence of features that we do not notice or
believe to be relevant in explaining behavior [e.g. 33].
The general view of this paradigm is that our
behaviors and actions are better explained in terms
of the particularities of the situation that often go
unnoticed or are deemed irrelevant than in terms of
internal character traits, virtues, and morality. If it
really is the case that the particularities of the situation
strongly influence our ability to respond to reasons,
our ability to respond to reasons in situations in which
we respond to reasons, does not indicate that we were
able to respond to reasons in situations in which we
do not do so. So in the light of the BCN-sciences it is
not clear how, on a new compatibilist account, it
would ever be possible to do something wrong while
being responsible for it.
The new compatibilist is not only committed to
explain how it is ever possible that a wrongdoer was
able to respond to reasons, although in fact she did
not do so. The new compatibilist should also explain
why in cases of wrongdoing it is reasonable to assume
by default that the wrongdoer was able to respond to
reasons. After all, in our daily practices we hold
wrongdoers by default responsible for what they did.
However, if situationist psychologists are right about
the influence of the situation on what we do and
decide, this practice must be reconsidered. If the
particularities of the situation rather than differences
in agential decision procedures determine whether or
not someone acts morally it seems not reasonable to
hold the agent responsible for acting wrong. As Doris
observes, the challenge of situationism is that the
sensible default attitude would be: “[...] a general
agnosticism about responsibility attribution, since we
could never confidently rule out the presence of
competence defeaters” [33: 138].
This is a problem for new compatibilism, which
argues that the assumption that we are reasons-
responsive beings is metaphysically modest. Therefore,
new compatibilism needs our reasons-responsiveness
to be an unproblematic, easy to observe aspect of our
13 Fischer & Ravizza’s account is of course much more
sophisticated. They distinguish two components of reason-
responsiveness: receptivity to reasons and reactivity to reasons.
‘Receptivity to reasons’ refers to the ability of a person to
recognize the relevant reasons, ‘reactivity to reasons’ refers to
the ability to respond adequately to the reasons that are
recognized. In their view a person is responsible for what she
did if the mechanism leading to her action was ‘moderately
responsive to reasons’, that is ‘regularly receptive’ to a variety
of reasons, some of which are moral reasons, and ‘weakly
reactive to reasons’. ‘Regularly responsive’ means that the
person recognizes an understandable pattern of reasons. Which
reasons are moral reasons is to be determined by the
community in which the person lives. ‘Weakly reactive’ means
that the person appropriately reacts to at least one reason if
recognized. Organisms that do not meet the receptivity
requirement (Fischer & Ravizza mention animals, young
children and psychopaths) fail to be moral beings at all and
should not be treated as such. Both the thieving student and the
kleptomaniac in our examples are regular receptive to reasons.
The requirement of weak reactivity is meant to explain how it is
possible that someone who on a certain occasion does not
respond to certain reasons can nevertheless be thought to able
to respond to those reasons in that very occasion (and, hence,
be held responsible for not responding). We limit our discussion
to the requirement of weak reactivity because this is the one
that should solve the problem to which we draw attention.
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acting immorally can be taken at face value, we can
infer that at least sometimes some of us act immorally
and are to blame for it e.g. the thieving student, but not
the kleptomaniac. The BCN-sciences challenge this
assumption.
So, the BCN-sciences pose at least three problems
to the new compatibilist. First, the new compatibilist
should find a way to accommodate the insight that
most of our everyday life is determined by automatic
processes triggered by external cues without intro-
ducing obscurities. Second, in the light of the BCN-
thesis that giving reasons is a matter of post hoc
interpretation, the new compatibilist cannot point to
our every day practice to determine whether someone
was responsible for doing wrong on the basis of the
reasons they give to rebut the challenge that the new
compatibilists’ idea that some wrongdoers are able to
respond to reasons to which they do not respond is as
obscure as the libertarians’ idea that those wrongdoers
were able to do otherwise. Third, the new compatibi-
list should answer the challenge that everyone’s
ability to act for reasons is heavily compromised by
the influence of the situation.
Before concluding, let us emphasize that in our
view these challenges are problems that should be
addressed rather than findings that undermine new
compatibilism. We ourselves are not convinced of the
new compatibilist view in all its aspects. However, we
do believe that it correctly points to the importance of
our abilities to respond to reasons as a key to
understanding our moral practices. For that reason,
we believe that our understanding of free will and
responsibility will be improved if we take BCN-
findings concerning these abilities into account. We
suspect that, in doing so, some version of incompa-
tibilist free will will reappear, but this does not alter
our view that our common point of focus should be
the efficacy of reasons, moral deliberation, and our
general reasons-responsiveness.
Conclusion
Our main point has been that the alleged threat of the
BCN-sciences to free will and personal responsibility
must be discussed in connection with our ability to act
for reasons. New compatibilism, which we regard as
the most influential compatibilist view of personal
responsibility today, seeks the basis for our ascrip-
tions of personal responsibility in our ability to act for
reasons. The main attraction of this view is the fact
that our ability to act for reasons seems so mundane
and undeniable, quite unlike an assumed ability to do
otherwise. Our daily practice of asking and giving
reasons seems to show that we are acting for reasons
all the time. However, as we discussed, developments
in the BCN-sciences suggest that it is not as obvious
as it seems that our ability to act for reasons can serve
as an unproblematic basis for our views of free will
and responsibility. The BCN-findings indicate that
most of daily life consists of automatic responses to
external stimuli. To accommodate this insight, the
new compatibilists must find a way to distinguish
automatic actions for a reason from automatic actions
that were not for a reason. It is not obvious that this
distinction can be made without an appeal to
something like the freedom to do otherwise. Further-
more, developments in the BCN-sciences suggest that
our self-reports and self-understanding are not neces-
sarily evidence of the ability to act for reasons. This
underscores a problem that arises independent of the
BCN-findings: How to justify our everyday ascrip-
tions of personal responsibility for wrongdoings
(including us taking responsibility for our own
wrongdoings). Wrongdoings typically disclose a
failure to respond adequately to the reasons that exist.
So the new compatibilist seems committed to the
view that at least in certain cases wrongdoers were
capable of responding to the reasons to which they, in
fact, did not respond. This sounds as obscure as being
able to do otherwise than one, in fact, did, but the new
compatibilist might point out that in our everyday
practices we routinely infer that some people are
responsible for wrongdoings based on the reasons
they provide. However, if the BCN-science are right
that giving reasons is a matter of post hoc interpre-
tation rather than of recalling motivations it might be
that the differences between those who are deemed to
be responsible for their wrongdoings and those who
are not, have more to do with their ability to interpret
14 Elsewhere we argued that, if we restrict the new compatibi-
list position as applicable only to our everyday moral wrong-
doings—cycling on the pavement, ignoring traffic regulations,
and so on—, its justifying strength can be saved [36].
Challenge To Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility 131what they did than with their ability to act for reasons.
This brings to the fore the situationist challenge that
the particularities of the situation might adequately
explain wrongdoings, hence, excuse the wrongdoing
agent. If this is correct, then our everyday beliefs
about personal responsibility need serious revision; if
it is not, we need to determine how to respond to the
overwhelming and fascinating evidence from the
BCN-sciences that problematizes our reasons-
responsive abilities.
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